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UNITED NATIONS INTERNATIONAL
CODE OF CONDUCT ON THE
TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY
HOMER

0. BLAmr*

INTRODUCTION

Over the last few years, negotiations have taken place at the
United Nations in Geneva in an attempt to formulate a code of
conduct on the transfer of technology. The initial impetus for
the Code was generated by people of some of the developing nations and has recently been encouraged and assisted by the
Committee on Transfer of Technology of the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development.' The Code is premised
on the belief that the industrial nations possess technology
which would materially assist the less developed countries in
their development and rapidly raise their standards of living.
Those who have been promoting the Code are generally persons
with no experience in technology transfer. Yet they cite a
number of examples of what they feel has happened to developing countries' organizations when they have attempted to obtain
technology from an industrialized nation.
The cornerstone rationale of the Code, and the unspoken assumption in its negotiations, is that desired technology is principally possessed by the large multinational enterprises located in
the developed nations. These businesses must be forced to
make technology available to less-developed countries' organizations on terms which would be advantageous to both parties
to the transfer agreement. The multinationals must be required
to cease a number of their restrictive business practices. The
developing enterprises need special assistance in order to in* B.S., J.D., University of Washington. Mr. Blair is Vice President,
Patents and Licensing, of Itek Corporation, Lexington, Massachusetts. The

author was a delegate to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development meetings in Geneva Switzerland relating to the transfer of technology. He is a member of the United States Department of State Advisory
Committee on International Intellectual Property, and previously served as
President of the Licensing Executives Society (U.S.A.), the largest member
society of the international licensing organization. In addition, Mr. Blair
has authored articles and delivered numerous speeches on patent and licensing law and the international transfer of technology.
1. The conference will be hereinafter referred to in the text as
UNCTAD.
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crease their bargaining power with the established entities. Another important assumption is that multinational organizations
are eager to transfer their technology to developing nations and
will do so regardless of the conditions imposed on them by either local regulations or an international code.
One of the comparatively novel proposed codes was the
Pugwash Code of Conduct for Transfer of Technology. It was
submitted in the report of the working group at the Pugwash
Conference held in Geneva in April, 1974. This document was
published and circulated by UNCTAD on July 15, 1974, at the
request of the permanent representative of Algeria, who at that
time was chairman of the developing nations' group at technology transfer sessions. Since that time, there have been a
number of meetings of governmental groups of "experts" under
the auspices of UNCTAD. While it was thought that an acceptable code could be prepared quickly, to this date, the goal has yet
to be attained.
One problem that is common in international conferences is
that the meetings are conducted by groups of "governmental experts" who, after promulgation of policy, will not have to actually implement it. This would be the responsibility of others in
their countries. Thus, the discussants themselves will not be
faced with whatever difficulties might arise under an international code. Unfortunately, technology transfer is a fairly complex subject, particularly regarding patents, trademarks, and
know-how, which are fields which few, if any, non-specialists can
readily master.
Hence, the major difficulty encountered in attempting to
prepare a technology transfer code is that, as is generally the
case with United Nations "expert" meetings, nearly all participants are not experts. Few have been significantly involved in
either negotiating or administering technology transfer agreements. Thus, the meetings have often fostered political
speeches which appease home governments but hamper negotiations. Even though those in attendance are usually.quite intelligent and dedicated, by lacking practical experience, they often
fail to evaluate proposals from either the developing or developed-nation viewpoint.
The most recent United Nations Conference was held in Geneva in the fall of 1978. Supplementary conferences are scheduled for 1979. While the developing nations hope to complete a
code in 1979, various factors mitigate against attainment of this
goal.
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FUNDAMENTAL BASES OF THE LATEST

DRAFT

OF THE PROPOSED

CODE

Substantial effort has been expended on this proposed
Code.2 However, more time has probably been spent on the "restrictive business practices" and "guarantees" chapters. 3 While
much of the proposed Code has been agreed upon, there are still
many significant areas where all parties have not concurred.
As is the case in other UNCTAD conferences, there are
three primary groups of countries involved. One is known as the
Group of 77. It now includes more than 120 developing states.
Among the group, the Latin American nations are particularly
active in code of conduct negotiations. The second subdivision
is the Group B, market economy-developed, countries of Western Europe, the United States, Canada, Japan, Australia, New
Zealand, and a few others. The third major category, Group D,
includes the planned economy countries of Eastern Europe and
the Soviet Union.4 With respect to development, Group D is regarded as developed. Thus, on many issues, they advance the
same contentions as Group B vis-a-vis the Group of 77.
Certain aspects of the latest version of the proposed Code
require explanation and critical comment. For simplicity, this
will be done in the order in which this draft has been written.
This is not necessarily the order of most importance. The more
significant sections, such as the definitional chapter, will be
scrutinized accordingly.
Preamble
The preamble of the proposed Code,5 as might be expected,
2. The United Nations Conference on an International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology (Nov. 10, 1978) [hereinafter cited as Proposed Code of Conduct).
3. See text accompanying notes 22-75 infra.
4. Wherever differences of opinion occur, language supported by the
Group of 77, Group B, and Group D will be indicated by one, two, or three
asterisks respectively.
5. The preamble sets the tone for the proposed Code of Conduct:
(1) Recognizing the fundamental role of science and technology
in the socio-economic development of all countries, and in particular, in

the acceleration of the development of the developing countries;
(2) Believing that technology is key to the progress of mankind

and that all peoples have the right to benefit from the advances and
developments in science and technology in order to improve their standards of living;
(3) Bearing in mind relevant decisions of the General Assembly
and other bodies of the United Nations, in particular UNCTAD, on the
transfer and development of technology;
(4) Recognizing the need to facilitate an adequate transfer and
development of technology so as to strengthen the scientific and tech-
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has been agreed upon in large part. The primary items remaining for negotiation are clauses eleven through thirteen. They relate to whether the Code should be an international legally
binding instrument or a mere voluntary guideline. The developing nations want to make it legally binding, while the Group B

countries prefer it to remain a voluntary model.
Objectives and Principles
Again, as might be expected, the objectives sub-chapter 6
nological capabilities of all countries, particularly the developing countries, and to co-operate with the developing countries in their own
efforts in this field as a decisive step in the progress towards the establishment of a new international economic order;
(5) Desirous of promoting international scientific and technological co-operation in the interest of peace, security, and national independence, and for the benefit of all nations;
(6) Striving to promote an increase in the international transfer
of technology with an equal opportunity for all countries to participate
irrespective of their social and economic system and of their level of
economic development;
(7) Recognizing the need for developed countries to grant special
treatment to the developing countries in the field of the transfer of technology;
(8) Drawing attention to the need to improve the flow of technological information, and in particular to promote the widest and fullest
flow of information on the availability of alternative technologies, and
on the selection of appropriate technologies suited to the specific needs
of developing countries;
(9) Believing that a Code of Conduct will effectively assist the developing countries in their selection, acquisition, and effective use of
technologies appropriate to their needs in order to develop improved
economic standards and living conditions;
(10) Believing that a Code of Conduct will help to create conditions conducive to the promotion of the international transfer of technology, under mutually agreed and advantageous terms to all parties;
(11) Affirming the benefits to be derived from a universally applicable Code of Conduct and that all countries should [ensure] */*** [encourage] **that their enterprises, whether private or
public [shall conform] */*** [follow] **in all respects to the provisions of

this Code;

(12) [Convinced that an international legally binding instrument
is the only form capable of effectively regulating the transfer of technology; I*
(13) [Agree on the adoption of this international legally binding

Code of Conduct on transfer of technology];*

[Hereby set forth the following code of conduct consisting of guidelines for the international transfer of technology:] **
[This universally applicable Code of Conduct on the international
transfer of technology is established,] .***
6. The Code of Conduct is based on the following objectives:
(i) To establish general and equitable standards on which to
base [the] relationship among parties to transfer of technology transactions and governments concerned, taking into consideration their legitimate interests, and giving due recognition to special needs of
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has been generally agreed on. A few comments are needed,
however. The first objective relates to relationships among parties to transfer of technology transactions and governments concerned. This, of course, assumes that governments will be
interested in regulating technology transfer agreements. It
adopts the philosophy advocated by most of the developing nations: government is the only body that should be involved in
technology transfer. Fortunately, the United States government
has not adopted this view. Members of the United States delegation realize that most American technology is owned by the
private sector. While a number of countries regulate transfer
agreements, the United States does so only where exports of
7
technology are covered by export control legislation.
Objective (iii) seeks to encourage transfer of technology
transactions. Regardless of whether the Code will assist developing nations, it cannot really be categorized as encouraging
developing countries for the fulfillment of their economic and social development objectives.
(ii) To promote mutual confidence between parties as well as
their governments.
(iii) To encourage transfer of technology transactions,
particularly those involving developing countries, under conditions
where bargaining positions of the parties to the transactions are balanced in such a way as to avoid abuses of a stronger position and
thereby to achieve mutually satisfactory agreements.
(iv) To facilitate and increase the international flow of
technological information, particularly on the availability of alternative
technologies, as a prerequisite for the assessment, selection, adaptation, development, and use of technologies in all countries, particularly
in developing countries.
(v) To facilitate and increase the international flow of
proprietary as well as non-proprietary technology for strengthening the
growth of the scientific and technological capabilities of all countries, in
particular developing countries, so as to increase their participation in
world production and trade.
(vi) To increase the contributions of technology to the
identification and solution of social and economic problems of all countries, particularly the developing countries, including the development
of basic sectors of their national economies.
(vii) To facilitate the formulation, adoption, and implementation
of national policies, laws, and regulations on the subject of transfer of
technology by setting forth international norms.
(viii) To promote adequate arrangements as regards unpackaging
in terms of information concerning the various elements of the technology to be transferred, such as that required for technical, institutional,
and financial evaluation of the transaction, thus avoiding undue or unnecessary packaging.
(ix) Restrictive [business] practices (paragraph under
consideration).
(x) Guarantees/Responsibilities
(paragraph
under
consideration).
Proposed Code of Conduct, Objectives and Principles Chapter (1978).
7. See generally 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401 et seq. (Supp. 1979).
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transfers of technology. It may impede and probably will discourage technology transfer involving companies unable to employ large staffs of lawyers and economists. Small organizations
can ill afford to remain involved in lengthy negotiations in those
nations which require governmental approval of technology
transfer agreements.
Sections (ix) and (x) relate to restrictive business practices
and guarantees and responsibilities. These paragraphs have not
yet been completed. They will probably depend on finalization
of the main portions of the Code relating to those subjects. 8
While all three groups have concurred in many of the Code
principles, 9 some are still under negotiation. Paragraph (ii) sup8. See text accompanying notes 22-75 infra.
9. The proposed Code of Conduct is based on the following principles:
(i) The Code of Conduct is universally applicable in scope and
is addressed to all parties to transfer of technology transactions as well
as to all countries and groups of countries, irrespective of their economic and political systems and their levels of development.
(ii) The right of each State to employ all appropriate means of
facilitating and regulating the transfer of technology (paragraph under
consideration).
(iii) The principles of sovereign equality, political and economic
independence of nations [. and fulfillment in good faith of international
obligations] ** should be observed in transfer of technology.
(iv) Each State has the right to participate in international
transfer of technology irrespective of any differences in political, economic, and social systems. No State [shall]*/*** [should]** be subjected to discrimination of any kind based solely on such differences
[i.e. States in similar situations should not be given different treatment]** or [subject to limitations imposed by foreign policy and national security interests.]** [The use of economic and other measures
by the world community against certain States fully applies to transfer
of technology.]*/*** [Nothing in this Code shall be construed as impairing or derogating from the provisions of the Charter of the United
Nations or actions taken in pursuance thereof.] It is understood that
special treatment in transfer of technology [shall] */*** [should]** be
accorded to developing countries in accordance with the [relevant]**
provisions of this Code.
(v) The separate responsibilities of parties to transfer of
technology transactions, on the one hand, and those of governments
when not acting as parties, on the other, should be clearly distinguished.
(vi) Mutual benefits should accrue to technology supplying and
recipient parties in order to maintain and increase the international
flow of technology.
(vii) Facilitating and increasing the access to technology,
particularly for developing countries, under mutually agreed fair and
reasonable terms and conditions are fundamental elements in the process of technology transfer and development.
(viii) [Respect by parties and governments for appropriate protection of industrial property is necessary in order to provide incentives
for research, invention, development, disclosure, and transfer of technology.]
(ix) Technology supplying parties when operating in an
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ports the right of each state to employ resources needed to regulate technology transfers. Certainly this right is
unchallengeable. If a state wishes to facilitate or regulate these
transfers, they should and do have every right to do so. However, the manner in which this privilege is to be implemented
has not been agreed upon. This particular paragraph is under
consideration.
Clause (iv) includes a proposal of the Group of 77 and
Group D countries. It states that the use of economic and other
measures by the world community against certain states fully
applies to technology transfers. In actual practice, transfers will
become more effective and be more widely used if they can remain non-political. Political language, like that in this clause,
should not be contained in an international document.
DIVERGENT VIEWS ON CODE DEFINrrIONS

The definitional chapter may be the most important section
of the proposed Code. It is also the one that can do the most
damage to technology transfer. There are presently three versions of definitions being considered. One was prepared by the
chairman as a suggested compromise draft text. Two Group B
variations would modify the chairman's proposal. Most of my
comments will be directed to the Group B second revision. 10
One would expect it to be quite favorable to the Group B organizations.
Code negotiations have assumed that all technology transfer agreements involve a multinational corporation as the technology owner and licensor and a developing-nation organization
as the technology recipient and licensee. However, when the
definitional chapter is read, the Code seems much broader in
scope. It would cover a large percentage of agreements that all
multinational businesses enter into on a regular basis. Actually
it is probably not the intention of the negotiating parties to inacquiring country should respect the sovereignty and the laws of that
country, act with proper regard for that country's declared development
policies and priorities, and endeavour to contribute substantially to the
development of the acquiring country. The freedom of parties to nego-

tiate, conclude, and perform agreements for the transfer of technology
on mutually acceptable terms and conditions should be based on respect for the foregoing and other principles set forth in this Code.
(x)

tion).

(xi)

Dispute settlement (paragraph under consideration).

Legal character of the Code (paragraph under considera-

Proposed Code of Conduct, Objectives and Principles Chapter (1978).
10. For this reason only the contents of the working paper of the Group
B second revision of the Chairman's compromise draft text will be set forth
in pertinent part.
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elude many types of agreements which appear to be covered by
some of the definitions. The original version was much more
susceptible to criticism. While the new definitions constitute
improvements, they still pose potential problems.
One notable difficulty that the Code negotiators have failed
to comprehend is that most corporations are licensees more
often than licensors. They pay out much more in royalties than
they receive. This is understandable when one considers all the
organizations in the world which are engaged in any particular
technological area. It seems logical that technical developments
would usually be made by someone other than a particular company in any given field. It has become a tradition in many segments of industry to save considerable time and money by
taking licenses under technology developed by others. No risks
are involved and the production timeframe is substantially
shortened.
Many present members of management feel that research
and development is expensive and unnecessarily risky.
Purchasing the right to use another's technology is less expensive, and a variety of risks is eliminated. This trend should continue in the future. Thus, many of the following remarks deal
not only with the licensor's viewpoint, but also with the concerns of licensees. Contrary to the opinion of those who are
working on it, the Code probably causes equivalent problems for
licensors and licensees.
"Party"

The "party" definition' includes individual persons and
groups of individuals such as corporations, partnerships, small
businesses, and universities. There is nothing in the definition
that limits the scope of covered agreements to licenses from
large, developed nations' organizations to those in less-developed countries. It should be so limited.
11. The Group B definition states that:
"Party" means any person, either natural or juridicial, of public or
private law, either individual or collective, such as corporations, companies, firms, partnerships, and other associations, or any combination
thereof, whether created, owned, or controlled by States, government
agencies, juridicial persons, or individuals, [including so-called incorporated branches, subsidiaries and affiliates, joint ventures, or other
entities directly or indirectly controlled by them,] as well as
States/Governments, government agencies, and international organizations, when they engage in an international transfer of technology
transaction of a commercial nature.
Tentative Paper By Group B on Definitions and Scope of Application, para.
1(a) (1978).
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"Transfer of Technology Transactions"
Transfer of technology 12 transactions are defined as agreements between parties which have as their main purpose any of
five different categorical transfers.' 3 The first group includes assignment, sale, and licensing of all forms of industrial property,
insofar as they are an integral part of such transactions. This
provision embraces the mere naked licensing of a patent or
trademark as a transfer of technology transaction. Such trademark licenses might encounter difficulties in the United States
under the Lanham Act. 14 Yet there are perfectly valid trademark licenses where no actual technology is transferred except
for the right to use the trademark subject to appropriate product
quality control. This is particularly true of the trademark licensing business involving designer names, motion picture or television characters, and sporting figures.
If an American company is sued for infringement of a
United States patent owned by a foreign corporation which had
developed the technology in its own country, settlement of the
suit could result in a mere naked patent license between the two
companies. Though no trademarks or know-how would be conveyed, this agreement would be within the purview of the Code
as it is clearly comprehended as a transfer of technology transaction. This definition is in need of modification. The Code
should not apply to transactions which are naked assignments,
12. "'Transfer of technology' means the transfer of production technologies and technical knowledge and integrally associated management or
marketing techniques, as well as the supply of technical services related
thereto, and does not extend to transactions involving only the sale or lease

of goods." Id. para.2.
13. Id. para.3. The five listed purposes are:
(a) Assignment, sale, and licensing of all forms of industrial property, including patents, utility models, industrial designs, as well as
trademarks, service marks, service names, and trade names insofar as

they are an integral part of such transactions;
(b) Provision of know-how and technical information in the form
of feasibility studies, plans, diagrammes, models, instructions, guides,
formulae, specifications, and equipment for technical training;
(c) Provision of know-how and technical expertise, including marketing and management techniques, and technical services through

technical, advisory, and managerial personnel and personnel training;
(d) Provision of the technological content of technical and operational services and co-operation for the installation, operation, and

functioning of plant and equipment in connection with turn-key
projects;
(e) Provision of the technological content of purchases, leases,
and other forms of utilization or acquisition of machinery, equipment,

intermediate goods, and/or raw materials in so far as they are an integral part of such transactions.
Id. paras. 3(a)-3(e).
14. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051 et seq. (1970).
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sales, or licenses of patents, inventor's certificates, utility models, industrial designs, trademarks, service marks, and trade
names.
Clause 4 of the definitional chapter deals with the scope of
the Code. 15 A transfer transaction between parties which do not
reside or are not established in the same country is apparently
encompassed by the Code, even if the transfer itself occurs in
one nation. This anomaly must be remedied. Know-how and
technical information should be provided by one party to another across national boundaries before a transfer is deemed to
be within the realm of covered transactions.
"Acquiring" and "Supplying" Parties
An "acquiring party" is defined as the "party which obtains
a license to use or exploit, purchases or otherwise acquires technology of a proprietary or non-proprietary nature and/or rights
related thereto in a transfer of technology."'16 Thus, it is apparent that anyone could be a technology acquiring party. The
scope of the Code should be restricted. It should not apply to
transactions in which the acquiring party is located in a developed nation. Such a limitation would comport with the Code's
main theme of encouraging development of underdeveloped
17
countries.
A "supplying party" is one "which licenses, sells, assigns, or
otherwise provides technology of a proprietary or non-proprietary nature and/or rights related thereto in a transfer of technology.' 8 Any technology transfer could be regulated by the Code
regardless of the minimal contribution made by various suppliers. The Code of Conduct should not apply to transfer of technology transactions when the supplying party is a small
business,19 a university, or one or a small number of individuals.
Nor should it apply when the transaction is an employment or
15. The Code of Conduct would apply to "international transfer of technology transactions which occur when technology is transferred across national boundaries between the supplying party and the acquiring party or
when a transfer of technology transaction is entered into between parties
which do not reside or are not established in the same country." Tentative
Paper By Group B on Definitions and Scope of Application, para. 4 (1978).
"The Code of Conduct is universally applicable in scope and is addressed to all countries and groups of countries, irrespective of their economic and political systems and their levels of development." Id. para. 5.
16. Id. para. 1(b).
17. See note 20 and accompanying text infra.

18. Tentative Paper By Group B on Definitions and Scope of Application, para. l(c) (1978).
19. A "small business" could be defined by the United States government.
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consultant agreement or is an agreement which has research
and development as one of its objectives.
Rights Transferred in More Than One Country and
UnsubstantialTransfer of Technology Transactions
One common problem is that a large number of licensing
agreements involve more than one country. For example, often
one may acquire "worldwide rights" under a form of technology.
At other times, one may acquire rights for the United States and
Canada or Europe. Assume one American company obtains a
license from another which grants the former worldwide rights
to make, use, and sell under this technology. This would permit
the licensee to manufacture the product in another country.
The Code should not regulate this type of an agreement. One
way to remedy this situation is to specifically exempt such arrangements from the Code. It should not apply to transfer of
technology transactions which occur when the technology is initially transferred within national boundaries between the supplying and acquiring parties.
Only substantial agreements should be covered by the Code
of Conduct. Fairly small and uncomplicated arrangements
should not be burdened by the great number of possible clauses
and approvals. Those under a certain size should be excluded
from the Code. The exact terms could be negotiated, but a reasonable exemption guideline could be those transactions in
which both parties agree that the contemplated payments involved for the first five years of the agreement would not exceed
$1,000,000, based on the value of United States currency as of
January 1, 1979.
SPECIAL TREATMENT FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND NATIONAL
REGULATION OF TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY

TRANSACTIONS CHAPTERS

One of the few sections which has been tentatively agreed
upon is the one demanding that technology owners provide special treatment for developing nations and organizations. 20 It includes a number of rather sweeping statements designed to
20. The agreed chapter on special treatment for developing countries
provides:
A. Taking into consideration the needs and problems of developing countries, particularly of the least developed countries, govern-

ments of developed countries, directly or through appropriate
international organizations, in order to facilitate and encourage the initiation and strengthening of the scientific and technological capabilities
of developing countries so as to assist and co-operate with them in their
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definitively engrain the principle that these underdeveloped
efforts to fulfill their economic and social objectives, should take adequate specific measures, inter alia, to:
(i) facilitate access by developing countries to available
information regarding the availabilities, description, location and, as far
as possible, approximate cost of technologies which might help those
countries to attain their economic and social development objectives;
(ii) give developing countries the freest and fullest possible
access to technologies whose transfer is not subject to private decisions;
(iii) facilitate access by developing countries, to the extent
practicable, to technologies whose transfer is subject to private decision;
(iv) assist and co-operate with developing countries in the
assessment and adaptation of existing technologies and in the development of national technologies by facilitating access, as far as possible,
to available scientific and industrial research data;
(v) co-operate in the development of scientific and
technological resources in developing countries, including the creation
and growth of innovative capacities;
(vi) assist developing countries in strengthening their
technological capacity, especially in the basic sectors of their national
economy, through creation of and support for laboratories, experimental facilities, and institutes for training and research;
(vii) co-operate in the establishment or strengthening of
national, regional, and/or international institutions, including technology transfer centers, to help developing countries to develop and obtain
the technology and skills required for the establishment, development,
and enhancement of their technological capabilities including the design, construction, and operation of plants;
(viii) encourage the adaptation of research and development, engineering and design to conditions and factor endowments prevailing in
developing countries;
(ix) co-operate in measures leading to greater utilization of the
managerial, engineering, design, and technical experience of the personnel and the institutions of the developing countries in specific economic and other development projects undertaken at the bilateral and
multilateral levels;
(x) encourage the training of personnel from developing
countries.
B. Governments of developed countries, directly or through appropriate international organizations, in assisting in the promotion of
transfer of technology to developing countries-particularly to the least
developed countries-should, as a part of programmes for development
assistance and co-operation, take into account requests from developing countries to:
(i) contribute to the development of national technologies in
developing countries by providing experts under development assistance and research exchange programmes;
(ii) provide training for research, engineering, design, and other
personnel from developing countries engaged in the development of national technologies or in the adaptation and use of technologies transferred;
(iii) provide assistance and co-operation in the development and
administration of laws and regulations with a view to facilitating the
transfer of technology;
(iv) provide support for projects in developing countries for the

19791

Transfer of Technology

countries must be assisted. It has encountered little objection
in the negotiating process.
The chapter on national regulation of transfer of technology
transactions 2 1 is fairly straightforward. Section 3.3(g) provides
that states should analyze and evaluate transactions in order to
development and adaptation of new and existing technologies suitable
to the particular needs of developing countries;
(v) grant credit on terms more favorable than the usual
commercial terms for financing the acquisition of capital and intermediate goods in the context of approved development projects involving
transfer of technology transactions so as to reduce the cost of projects
and improve the quality of technology received by the developing countries.
C. Governments of developed countries should take measures in
accordance with national policies, laws, and regulations, to encourage
and to endeavor to give incentive to enterprises and institutions in their
countries, either individually or in collaboration with enterprises and
institutions in developing countries particularly those in the least developed countries to make special efforts, inter alia,to:
(i) assist in the development of technological capabilities of the
enterprises in developing countries, including special training as required by the recipients;
(ii) undertake the development of technology appropriate to the
needs of developing countries;
(iii) undertake research and development activity in developing
countries of interest to such countries, as well as to improve co-operation between enterprises and scientific and technological insitutions of
developed and developing countries;
(iv) assist in projects by enterprises and institutions in developing countries for the development and adaptation of new and existing
technologies suitable to the particular needs and conditions of developing countries.
D. The special treatment accorded to developing countries should
be responsive to their economic and social objectives vis-a-vis their relative stage of economic and social development and with particular attention to the special problems and conditions of the least developed
countries.
Proposed Code of Conduct, Special Treatment For Developing Countries
Chapter (1978).
21. The Proposed Code of Conduct National Regulation of Transfer of
Technology Transactions Chapter.
3.1 In exercising their right to adopt laws, regulations and rules,
and policies with respect to transfer of technology transactions, States
may adopt such measures [as]* [relating to]**/*** evaluation, [negotiation]*/***, [renegotiation]* and registration of agreements and arrangements involving transfer of technology transactions [taking into
consideration their commitments arising in this field from international
treaty obligations to which they have subscribed and the provisions of
the Code of Conduct]* [in accordance with their international obligations under international law, treaties, and other agreements and taking into account the provisions of the Code of Conduct] ** [on the basis
of universally acknowledged principles and norms of international law
and treaty obligations and with respect to the provisions of the Code of
Conduct]***
3.2 In exercising this right States should act on the basis that:
A. These measures should:
(i) Recognize that a close relationship exists between
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assist parties in their negotiations. In practice this "assistance"
should delay large technology transfer operations and signifitechnology flows and the conditions under which such flows are admitted and treated;
(ii) Promote a favorable and beneficial climate for the
international transfer of technology;
(iii) Take into consideration in an equitable manner the legitimate interests of all parties;
(iv) Encourage and facilitate transfers of technology to take place
under mutually agreed, fair, and reasonable terms and conditions having regard to the Principles and Objectives of the Code;
(v) [ensure effective protection of industrial property rights and
other rights of parties involved in the transfer of technology.I** [ensure
an equitable balance between the needs of economic and social development, particularly of the developing countries, and the rights granted
by industrial property;] * [ensure effective protection of industrial property rights and other related rights] ***
(vi) take into account the differing factors characterizing the
transactions such as local conditions, the nature of the technology, and
the scope of the undertaking.
B. Necessary changes in the light of evolving circumstances in the
measures indicated in paragraph 3.1 should be made [with proper regard for the existing rights and obligations of the parties concerned] **/*** land in an orderly manner] **
C. Measures indicated in paragraph 3.1 including decisions of
competent administrative bodies should be applied equitably, in accordance with [fundamental fairness] ** and established procedures of
law land without discrimination] ** [and should be applied without any
discrimination] ***. Laws and regulations should be clearly defined and
publicly and readily available. To the extent appropriate, relevant information regarding decisions of competent administrative bodies
should be disseminated.
3.3 States should apply the provisions of paras. 3.1 and 3.2 when
adopting and implementing measures on regulation of the flow and effects of transfer of technology, finance, and technical aspects of technology transactions and on organizational forms and mechanisms dealing
with:
Finance
(a) Currency regulations on foreign exchange payments and remittances;
(b) Conditions of domestic credit and financing facilities;
(c) Transferability of payments;
(d) Tax treatment;
(e) Pricing policies;
Technical aspects
(f) Technology specifications and standards for the various components of the transfer of technology transactions and their payments;
(g) Analysis and evaluation of transfer of technology transactions
to assist parties in their negotiations;
(h) Use of local and imported components;
Organizationalforms and mechanisms
(i) Terms and conditions and the duration of transfer of technology transactions;
(j) Loss of ownership and/or control of domestic acquiring enterprises;
(k) Regulation of foreign collaboration arrangements and agree-
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cantly impede less substantial ones. This is another reason why
less complicated arrangements should be exempted from this
Code and local regulations. Individuals and small companies do
not have the staff, expertise, time, and funds that would be prerequisites to having their agreements approved by various governmental associations. It is more profitable for them to utilize
their assets in other ways. The return on smaller transfer agreements would be negligible after awaiting approval for long periods of time.
RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES

The Chapeau
One of the major problems with the Code of Conduct emanates from the chapter on restrictive business practices. While
the language employed prevents practices which nearly everyone condemns, it may be interpreted as forbidding activities universally accepted as legitimate in certain factual situations. It is
inappropriate and impractical to have a form license agreement
for this very reason. Each transfer of technology transaction is
unique in its aspects and ramifications. No standard set of
clauses covers them all. Each transfer is the result of separate
negotiations involving varying tradeoffs which seek fairness to
all parties. The distinct technologies and business facts make
standard agreements impractical.
A number of restrictive business practices have been mentioned in past international trade discussions. From time to
time, some have been added while others were deleted. At present there are twenty listed practices, though few can claim the
ments that could displace national enterprises from the domestic market
(1) The definition of fields of activity of foreign enterprises and
the choice of channels, mechanisms, organizational forms for the transfer of technology and the prior or subsequent approval of transfer of
technology transactions and their registration in these fields;
(m) The determination of the legal effect of transactions which are
not in conformity with national laws, regulations, and administrative
decisions on the transfer of technology;

(n) The establishment or strengthening of national administrative mechanisms for the implementation and application of the Code of
Conduct and of national laws, regulations, and policies on the transfer
of technology;
(o) Promotion of appropriate channels for the international exchange of information and experience in the field of the transfer of technology.
The Group of 77 reserves its position on all provisions of this chapter until it
has had the opportunity to examine the final proposed draft of the whole
Code.
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support of all of the groups of nations. In the Chapeau,2 2 the
introduction to the restrictive business practices chapter, there
are two main issues still under discussion. The first is whether
arrangements between parent companies and subsidiaries
should be regulated. The Group of 77 believes thai they should
be subject to regulation. The Group B nations generally disagree. Somewhat surprisingly, the United States delegation has
received minimal support from the other developed countries.
This Group B division has left this issue in doubt. The other
problem is an outgrowth of the preamble controversy on
whether the Code guidelines are to be mandatory or voluntary.
Group B states have steadfastly desired the term "should" not
to be strengthened to "shall" in the request that parties refrain
from condemned practices.
22. Section A, the Chapeau, enunciates the basic restrictive business
practices prohibition:
In furtherance of the objectives of this Code, particularly to avoid
practices which [unreasonably]** restrain trade [or]* adversely [affect]* [affecting] **/*** the international flow of technology, particu-

larly as such practices hinder the economic and technological
development of acquiring countries, parties to technology transfer
transactions [shall]*/*** [should] ** refrain from the following practices [or practices having similar effects]* [in licensing patents or
know-how or trademarks associated with patents or know-how] ** [un-

less the practice is] **/*** [subject to exceptions or justifications in the
following provisions or reasonable]** [in an individual case]** [.]*

[,]** [Whether a restrictive practice listed below is]* [consistent with
the objectives of this Code in an individual case]*/*** [which]***
[should be examined in terms of its purpose and effect in the actual
situation,]*/*** taking into account [its appropriateness in]*/***
[all] ** the relevant circumstances, including those prevailing at the inception of the arrangement [and its acceptability under pertinent national or regional laws or regulations for control of restrictive
practices] *.

[Practices and restrictions between commonly owned enterprises
should be examined in the light of the rules, exceptions, and factors
applicable to all transfer of technology transactions. Such practices

may be considered as not contrary to the provisions of the Code when
they are otherwise acceptable and which do not adversely affect the
transfer of technology.] * [Recognizing that restrictions for the purpose
of rationalization or reasonable allocation of functions between parent
and subsidiary or among enterprises belonging to the same concern
will normally be considered not contrary to this chapter unless amounting to an abuse of a dominant position of market power within the relevant market, for example, unreasonable restraint of the trade of a
competing enterprise.] **
Proposed Code of Conduct, Restrictive Business Practices Chapter, para. A
(1978).
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Listed Practices

Grantback
'23
The first listed practice is labeled "grantback provisions.
One of the remaining subjects for discussion is whether this
sub-section should apply to exclusive and non-exclusive
grantback. Group B would restrict the ban to exclusive
grantback. The other nations do not concur. Another troublespot is whether grantbacks should be prohibited unless there is
offsetting consideration or reciprocal obligations from the supplying party. The Group of 77 supports this restriction for all
grantbacks. The Group B nations want it to apply only to exclusive grantbacks. If the Group of 77 version was adopted, it might
imply that a non-exclusive grantback is improper without offsetting consideration or reciprocal obligations from the supplying
party. Unfairness might result in individual situations.
Many times in mere confidential disclosure arrangements,
the disclosing party provides in a clause that if the receiving
party improves upon the confidential information, the supplying
party will receive a non-exclusive, royalty-free license back and
will continue to practice the basic technology and the improvement. If this was not the case, suppliers would not divulge confidences or would make only incomplete disclosures. In
appropriate circumstances, such agreements are the most equitable approach to the difficult task of handling confidential disclosures of technical information. Yet the Group of 77
suggestion would force abandonment of these arrangements
since they fail to provide offsetting consideration or reciprocal
obligations.

Challenges to Validity
The challenges to validity clause provides that it is a restrictive business practice to require "the acquiring party to refrain
from challenging the validity of patents and other types of protection for inventions involved in the transfer .... ,,24 Group B
wants to insert the modifier "unreasonably" at the beginning of
this statement. This would mean that a rule of reason would be
23. The proposed language of this section describes prohibited
grantback as:
Requiring the acquiring party to transfer or grant back to the supplying party, or to any other enterprise designated by the supplying
party, improvements arising from the acquired technology, on an exclusive basis [or]* without offsetting consideration or reciprocal obligations from the supplying party, or when the practice will constitute an
abuse of a dominant market position of the supplying party.
Id. para. B1.
24. Id. para. B2.
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used to analyze a particular situation, rather than relying on an
absolute, inflexible rule. This section also provides that the
rights and obligations of the parties will be determined by the
appropriate applicable law and consistent terms of the agreement. 25 While this provision is in general accord with Lear,Inc.
v. Adkins,26 it changes the law in many countries. Of course,
in our country which
Lear itself causes some practical problems
27
resolved.
judicially
been
have not yet
If negotiations are undertaken between two parties and a
patent license is involved, a royalty rate may be settled at a
lower value in a straightforward business discussion than after
extensive litigation in which the patent's validity was upheld.
The cost of enforcing a patent may easily exceed one-half of one
million dollars in today's market. If a patent owner may be
forced to expend that amount to uphold its validity, he should be
entitled to receive a somewhat higher royalty rate. Unfortunately, the particular language of this section makes it possible,
and sometimes desirable, for the acquiring party to negotiate
the lowest conceivable royalty. As soon as he establishes the
royalty in the signed license agreement, he can then challenge
the validity of the patent, and leave himself in an enviable position. If he fails to prevail on his invalidity contention, he will
still have the license at the low royalty rate. A court would probably impose the low rate regardless of whether the license remained in existence. If the patent contest is successful, he pays
nothing.
25. Id.
26. 395 U.S. 653, 162 U.S.P.Q. 1 (1969).
27. Lear itself dealt with the problem of a conflict in the attempted accommodation of the common law of contracts and the federal patent law
requirement that ideas in general circulation be dedicated to the public unless legally protected by a valid patent. The respondent inventor agreed to
license his discovery to his company. Lear, Inc. reserved the option to terminate the license if a patent on the invention was refused or held invalid
subsequently. A patent was issued, but the company later discovered that
there was a patent that fully anticipated Adkins' discovery. Respondent

brought suit when the company terminated royalty payments.
The trial court allowed the company to defend by questioning the validity of the patent. The California Supreme Court held that the license agreement originally entered into was binding, and that the doctrine of estoppel
precluded challenging the patent's validity. 67 Cal. 2d 882, 435 P.2d 321, 156
U.S.P.Q. 258 (1967). The Supreme Court vacated and remanded. 395 U.S. at

676, 162 U.S.P.Q. at 10. The rules of contract law had to yield to federal patent law inconsistent thereto. After the patent had been issued in this case,
the demands of the public interest, represented by patent doctrine, re-

placed contractual obligations as the core of the case. Patent policies al-

lowed the company to terminate payments under the agreement pending
its challenge of the patent's validity. Id. at 674, 162 U.S.P.Q. at 9. See also
Rose & Martin, Recent Developments in Patent Office Practice-1978,13 J.
MAR. L. REV. 1 (1979).
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Nevertheless, the patent owner would have to have spent an
exorbitant amount of money defending his patent. Even if the
patent holder prevails, he is left with the nominal royalty. It
would be more equitable to permit the patent owner to terminate the licensing agreement if validity was challenged. Thus, if
the validity of the patent was upheld, there would be supplementary negotiations, and a new royalty would have to be set.
This challenges to validity section, as proposed, encourages litigation because the party taking a license from the patent holder
is in a "can't lose" situation. One principal objective of technology transfer agreements should be to reduce litigation. This
28
provision should be altered toward attainment of this goal.
Exclusive Sales or Representation Agreements
The restrictive business practice chapter prohibits
"[r] equiring the acquiring party to grant exclusive sales or rep28. Five other restrictive business practices are listed:
3. Restrictions on the freedom of the acquiring party to enter into
sales, representation, or manufacturing agreements relating to similar
or competing technologies or products or to obtain competing technology, when such restrictions are not needed for ensuring the achievement of legitimate interests, particularly including securing the
confidentiality of the technology transferred or best effort distribution
or promotional obligations;
4. [Unreasonably] **/*** restricting the acquiring party either in
undertaking research and development directed to absorb and adapt
the transferred technology to local conditions or in initiating research
and development programs in connection with new products,
processes, or equipment;
5. [Unreasonably]** requiring the acquiring party to use personnel designated by the supplying party, except to the extent necessary to
ensure the efficient transmission phase for the transfer of technology
and putting it to use or thereafter continuing such requirement beyond
the time when adequately trained local personnel are available or have
been trained; or prejudicing the personnel of the technology acquiring
country;
6. Restrictions [unjustifiably] ** regulating prices to be charged by
[competing]**/*** acquiring parties in the country to which the technology was transferred for products manufactured or services produced
using the technology supplied;
7. Restrictions which [unreasonably]** prevent the acquiring
party from adapting the imported technology to local conditions or introducing innovations in it, or which oblige the acquiring party to introduce unwanted or unnecessary design or specification changes, if the
acquiring party makes adaptations on his own responsibility and without using the technology supplying party's name, trade or service
marks or trade names, and except to the extent that this adaptation
unsuitably affects those products, or the processes for their manufacture, to be supplied to the supplying party, his designates, or his other
licensees, or to be used as a component or spare part in a product to be
supplied to his customers.

Proposed Code of Conduct, Restrictive Business Practices Chapter, paras.
B3-B7 (1978).
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resentation rights to the supplying party or any person designated by the supplying party .... -29 In a number of situations,
it may be desirable for the acquiring party to manufacture and
sell goods to the supplying party or another designated person.
This would permit him to produce the item without having to
confront marketing problems. It is not unusual in agreements
between two developed-country organizations to have one with
substantial technology enter into a joint venture with one with
considerable marketing expertise in a particular nation. Such
an undertaking may amount to a profitable arrangement for
both parties, as it combines concentration on manufacturing
with local marketing skills.
However, it appears that if such a provision was inserted in
a transfer of technology agreement, it might run counter to the
restriction against "requiring" the acquiring party to grant these
rights. It would amount to a restrictive business practice even
though the acquiring party acquiesces, and it is beneficial for
him and his country. Even if a statement was inserted in the
agreement acknowledging that such was the acquiring party's
desire, many governmental agencies would probably consider it
a self-serving statement entitled to no weight. Hence, this strict
language appears to forbid some advantageous arrangements.
An absolute ban of a particular practice would in many situations frustrate the intention of all parties concerned.
Tying Arrangements
The tying arrangements clause 30 presents similar constructional difficulties. It proscribes "requiring" acceptance of additional technology, future inventions, and improvements not
desired by the acquiring party. What if the acquiring party requests future inventions and improvements and incorporates a
29. Id. para. B8. This provision makes an exception for "sub-contracting
or manufacturing arrangements wherein the parties agreed that all or part

of the production under the technology transfer arrangement will be distributed by the supplying party or any person designated by him." Id.

by:

30. Clause 9 states that a party commits a restrictive business practice

[Unreasonably]** requiring acceptance of additional technology,
future inventions and improvements, goods, or services not wanted by

the acquiring party or [unreasonably]*

designating or restricting

sources of technology, goods, or services as a condition for obtaining
the technology required.
[This shall not apply where required to maintain quality to protect
the supplier's reputation when his trade or service mark or trade or corporate name is used by the acquiring party, or to meet the requirements of a guarantee, where adequate specification of ingredients is not

feasible or would involve disclosure of a trade secret.] **/***
Id. para. B9.
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demand in the agreement so stating? Is he barred by the language that requiring acceptance of this additional future technology is restricted? Would the government or United Nations
body which would be approving the agreement claim that these
items were merely self-serving such that the acquiring party
was forced to acquiesce? This anomaly points out why the term
"unreasonably," which the Group B states would insert, should
modify this clause. The per se rule will inevitably occasion
harsh results in individual factual situations. It should be altered to comport with the Group B viewpoint.
The second tying arrangements paragraph relates to maintaining quality to protect a supplier's reputation when his trade
or service mark or trade or company name is used by the acquiring party. It is quite important and should be included. Both
the Group B and Group D countries support it.
Export Restrictions
Various export restrictions constitute forbidden restrictive
business practices. 31 Because the groups of countries have
promulgated divergent forms, this clause is extremely difficult
to understand.
-

Quantity Limitations

Section 10, in conjunction with the limitations on volume
and scope, 32 precludes utilization of quantitative limitations in
technology transfer agreements. If one company granted a license to another for the construction of a plant with a one million pound production capacity and required a payment of
$500,000, is it really unreasonable to demand an additional
equivalent sum if the licensee wants to open another factory of
identical output? The amount expended for the transferred
technology should relate to the degree that it is utilized. Minimal usage should require a fairly nominal monetary outlay. Relatively more extensive use should be compensated for
31. The prohibited export restrictions include:
[Unreasonable]** Restrictions which prevent or [substantially] **/*** hinder export by means of territorial or quantitative limitations or prior approval for export or export prices of products or
increased rates of payments for exportable products resulting from the
technology supplied [, unless justified] /* [, for instance,] * [to prevent export of such products to countries where they are protected by
the supplying party's industrial property rights] **/*** [or where relevant know-how has retained its confidential character] ** [, or where
the supplying party has granted]**/*** [an exclusive right]*** [a license]** [to use the relevant technology.]**/***
Id. para. B10.
32. See note 37 and accompanying text infra.
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accordingly. One approach would be a percentage royalty. Another method would charge lump-sum payments based on the
capacity of the plant involved. These could possibly be payable
periodically. However, clause 10 might mean governments
could claim that a quantitative limitation on plant size would
hinder the exportation of the item produced and, therefore, be
an unreasonable business practice.
Prevention of Exports Protected by Supplying Party's Patent
Rights

-

The portion of this section justifying export restrictions
when they prevent exportation of products to countries where
they are protected by the supplying party's industrial property
rights should be maintained. This important provision is supported by both the Group B and Group D nations.
- Prevention of Exports when Supplying Party Has Granted
Licenses to Others
A proper conclusion is reached in accepting export restrictions where the supplying party has granted an exclusive right
or license to use the relevant technology. However, the first
country in which a right was granted, such as Mexico, would
then acquire the right to export to all other countries. If the patent owner granted a license in Argentina under the Argentine
patent, the Mexican company would have the right to export to
Argentina under the earlier agreement because there would not
have been a license granted there previously. The Argentine license would be limited by the prior grant, but would still be effective against subsequent licenses conferred in other countries.
If the "exclusive right" language has to be included, the Code
should state that countries in which a license is granted within
five years of the preliminary grant could be excluded from export rights if the products are protected by the supplying party's
industrial property rights.
These export restrictions should not be construed solely as
developed-country organization attempts to impose their will on
enterprises in less industrialized nations. For example, a Mexican company with an exclusive license for its own country
under a patent owner's Mexican patent could be financially ruined if a large American licensee under a United States patent
could import into Mexico. The technical expertise and financial
power of the American firm would hamper Mexican business efforts. Nor would the Mexican company be pleased if a Hong
Kong licensee began importing into Mexico and selling products
at Mexican prices.
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If legitimate industrial property rights exist in the countries
involved, it would usually be to the advantage of the recipient
developing-country organization if imports from other states
were prohibited. For many years, developing-country organizations will encounter difficulties competing with entities from
other nations. Without the protection of the supplying party's
patents, acquiring parties face trouble competing in their own
markets against enterprises with great expertise and those employing "cheap labor."
Cartels/Patent-Poolor Cross-Licensing Agreements
Patent-pool or cross-licensing agreements among technology suppliers which impose restrictions on territories, quantities, prices, customers, or markets, or limit access to new
33
technological developments, are prohibited.
-

Territories

Two organizations would be prevented from cross-licensing
under their respective technologies in a small number of countries which either prohibit exports to other countries where one
party owned patents or limit the use of certain technology to distinct markets. A United States corporation may have cross-licensing agreements with many American and foreign
companies wherein it acquires non-exclusive patent licenses in
its field of interest. Other parties obtain rights in their areas of
expertise. But an agreement with a Canadian company would
apparently be improper under this section. There would be a
restriction on the market involved because the American enterprise would be unable to utilize the Canadian entity's technology in markets other than in its speciality. The Canadian
company would be restricted to using the American know-how
in its own area of expertise. An impropriety would also apparently occur under a cross-licensing agreement which does not
grant worldwide rights under all of one party's patents.
33. Proposed Code of Conduct, Restrictive Business Practices Chapter,
para. BlI (1978) provides:
[Cartel, I* patent-pool or cross-licensing agreements Iand other collusive arrangements]*/*** among technology suppliers [, excluding
necessary restrictions, ancillary to joint ventures or co-operative research arrangements, **/*** [, including those between and among
parent companies, their subsidiaries, and their affiliates,] * which [unreasonably] * impose restrictions 1, inter alia,]* on territories, quantities, prices, customers, or markets, or limit access to new technological
developments [in order to] **/*** (or]* attempt to dominate an industry[,]* [or]**/*** market [or]* [by controlling a]**/*** technological
process, and that have adverse effects on the transfer of technology.
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The Scope of the Cross-LicensingRestrictions

The developing nations want this section to include crosslicensing arrangements between and among parent companies
and their subsidiaries and affiliates. On the contrary, they
should definitely be excluded. Another Group B proposal is
well-founded. The modifier "unreasonably" should be included
to prevent the possible harsh results of a per se prohibition of
the aforementioned cross-licensing agreements. The term
"technology supplier" appears to encompass any company involved in any type of cross-licensing. The practice contemplates
a flow back and forth between the parties involved.34 A license
agreement may join two companies, one technology supplier
and one acquirer. However, if improvements are licensed by the
original acquiring party to the original supplier, the former
would become a "technology supplier." In such a case, both entities would be "technology suppliers" and their agreement would
amount to a prohibited cross-license. This situation should be
remedied.
-

Quantity

Where improvements are supplied by one or both parties as
part of a cross-license agreement, could the quantity manufactured by one or both be restricted because lump-sum royalties
were sufficient to construct only one plant of a certain capacity?
Such an arrangement would be prohibited because contained in
a cross-licensing agreement. This section is extremely inclusive. Among many ramifications, it may have a substantial negative impact on legitimate transfers of technology.
Restrictions on Publicity
Section 12 prohibits restrictions regulating the advertising
or publicity by the acquiring party, subject to delineated exceptions.3 5 Once again inclusion of the modifier "unreasonably" is
34. See Joelson, United States Law and the Proposed Code of Conduct
on the Transfer of Technology, 23 ANrrrRusT BULL. 835 (1978).
35. The proposed Code would proscribe:
Restrictions [unreasonably] ** regulating the advertising or publicity by the acquiring party except where such restrictions of such public-

ity may be required to prevent injury to the supplying party's goodwill
or reputation where the advertising or publicity makes reference to the
supplying party's name, trade or service marks, trade names or other
identifying items, or for legitimate reasons of avoiding product liability
when the supplying party may be subject to such liability, or where appropriate for safety purposes or to protect consumers, or when needed
to secure the confidentiality of the technology transferred.
Proposed Code of Conduct, Restrictive Business Practices Chapter, para.
B12 (1978).
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of paramount importance. However, this clause would present a
problem if the advertising or publicity did not actually make reference to the supplying party's trademark on the product. The
supplying party would not be able to review this advertising.
Thus, the reputation of the trademark could be severely damaged if the products were publicly misrepresented. The fact that
the publicity makes no reference to the supplier is not particularly pertinent. The important inquiry point is as to whether the
product bears the supplying party's trade name or trademark.
In various cases, it may be perfectly proper to regulate advertising or publicity. There are a number of listed exceptions
to the preliminary clause. All are appropriate and necessary. A
number of other exceptions are conceivably just as pertinent.
Consider an advertising statement that a product is suitable for
a particular use, when in actual manufacture, such use would
pollute local air and water in violation of governmental regulations. The product supplier would be displeased by such publicity, as the item's function is misconstrued. The supplier might
incur legal liability in addition to damage to his reputation and
trademark. This and other situations point out the desirability
36
of selective regulatory review of advertising or publicity.
Limitations on Volume, Scope, and Capacity of Production
This limitations provision 37 is supported by the Group of 77
and Group D nations. Group B has not yet agreed to include
this wording. It will be the subject of further negotiation. The
Group of 77 would include a supplementary field of activity restriction ban. Group D would only prohibit unreasonable limitations on volume, scope, and capacity of production.
It is perfectly legitimate to grant a license for only a certain
volume or production capacity depending on how extensive a
36. Clauses 13 and 14 enumerate practices that parties are encouraged
to refrain from:
13. Requiring payments or imposing other obligations for continuing the use of industrial property rights which have been invalidated,
cancelled, or have expired, recognizing that any other issue, including
other payment obligations for technology, shall be dealt with by the appropriate applicable law and the terms of the agreement to the extent
consistent with that law.
14. Restrictions on the use of the technology after the expiration
or termination of the arrangement [, unless the technology is still legally protected, or has not entered the public domain] **/*** [or after
the know-how has lost its secret character] * independently of the ac-

quiring party.
Id. paras. B13-B14.

37. "[Unreasonable]*** [Restrictions on the scope, volume and/or capacity of production]*/*** [and/or field of activity]*" are prohibited. Id.

para. B15.
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monetary outlay is actually made. If a licensee's expenditure
entitles it to produce a determined output, it should be limited
to that amount.
The additional limitation urged by the Group of 77 would
prohibit all usage of field of activity restrictions. In actual practice, most license agreements provide that technology is to be
utilized on a particular product. This is a "field license." The
definition of the field in a license agreement is often one of its
most important clauses. One may have technology for catalyzing and manufacturing a number of polyolefin materials such as
polyethylene and polypropylene. A polyethylene producer desiring a license under this technology may have no interest in
manufacturing polypropylene. The fee he is prepared to pay
may only be sufficient to let him use the technology for polyethylene. If he wanted to prepare polypropylene, he would have
had to have paid an additional sum. His license is beneficially
limited to use in conjunction with a single manufacturing process. Such a license would be prohibited by the proposed language, however.
Similarly, a licensee may wish to acquire physical development technology for use in metal printing plate production. A
great number of inventions could emanate from this technology.3 8 Assume a licensee is granted the right to use the supplier's physical development technology to make metal printing
plates. The supplier may want to retain the use of the same
technology for its own main line of business. This would be prohibited by the Group of 77 proposal. The supplier would be
forced to grant the licensee an exclusive license for all fields.
This would prevent it from using the technology in its major line
of business. Suppliers would then probably refuse to license
their technology to anyone. The public would be detrimented
by a failure to maximize technical resources.
Certainly there are instances in which restricting a license
to a particular field would be improper. However, there are situations where such limitations are perfectly proper at least when
the business operation in question is investigated by the people
involved. At one time, the United States Department of Justice
deplored all fields of use licenses. In more recent years, this policy has been altered. The government has come to realize that
these licenses are appropriate, and even necessary, in certain
situations. The Group of 77's per se rule on field of activity re38. Included among possible inventions would be: chemical baths; particular coatings to be used on the metal substract; methods of reducing the
coating upon exposure to light; and developments of the coating. The same
physical development technology may also be used to make prints on paper, film, or on other substrates.
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strictions should be replaced by a prohibition that selectively
determines which licenses are neither practical nor useful.
Use of Quality Controls
The Group of 77 and Group D countries would prohibit "use
by the supplying party of quality control methods or standards9
'3
which are not needed or not wanted by the acquiring party.
Group D would not ban those necessary to meet the requirements of a guarantee. 4° Both groups would make an exception
service name, or trade
when the product bears a trademark,
41
name of the supplying party.
There are times when quality control methods should be
used whether or not needed or wanted by the acquiring party.
For example, a pharmaceutical licensee may produce without
complying with proper quality control safeguards. The product
may be faulty and harm consumers. Should not the manufacturing licensees be subject to quality controls for the benefit of
the public? The Group B approach takes cognizance of this duty
and responds affirmatively.
Technology suppliers have both a moral and legal obligation
to guarantee that products made by their licensees are of appropriate quality standards and safe for their intended use by consumers. Products derived from modern technology are often
complex. There must be strict controls so that they are properly
manufactured. These are not mere attempts by licensors to improperly bind licensees. Often quality controls are absolutely
necessary. Hence, broad prohibitions on these requirements,
under the guise of preventing oppressive action by suppliers,
preclude both supplier and manufacturer from protecting the
very purchasers that each attempts to serve. Certainly quality
controls are not indispensable components of all licenses. However, in many they are mandatory. If not permitted, defective
products may be extremely dangerous to consumers and impose
legal liability on manufacturers and technology licensors.
Other Restrictive Business Practices
Another proposed prohibition supported by the Group of 77
and Group D nations provides that the "requirement to use a
particular trademark, service name, or trade name when using
2
the technology supplied" is a restrictive business practice.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. para. B16.
Id.
Id.
Id. para. B17.
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This section could cause a problem, particularly if an agreement
provides that a trademark is to be used and the acquiring party
is eager to use it to help him increase his sales volume. If utilization of the mark is provided for in the agreement, this provision would invalidate the transfer. Group B has recognized the
benefits of certain trademark obligations and steadfastly op43
posed inclusion of this section.
Formulating "unlimited or unduly long duration" arrangements are also barred.4 At what point is the "unduly long" line
of demarcation reached? In some cases, three or four years
might be unduly long. It should be noted that in Aronson v.
Quick Point Pencil Co.,45 the United States government, in its
brief, found nothing wrong with unlimited term transfer of technology agreements. Actually, courts need not be concerned that
enforcing royalty obligations for indeterminate periods would
undermine federal antitrust policies. 46
Exceptions
The "exceptions" sub-chapter provides that any of the previously mentioned restrictive business practices may be exempted by a determination by "competent national authorities"
47
of the acquiring party's country that it is in the public interest.
This saving procedure will probably hamper licensing efforts
43. Id. Group B also opposes clause 18 which prohibits "obliging the acquiring party to provide equity capital or to allow the supplying party to
participate in the management of the acquiring party as a condition to obtaining the technology." Id. para. B18.
44. Id. para. B19.
45. 99 S. Ct. 1096, 201 U.S.P.Q. 1 (1979). In Quick Point, petitioner contracted with the respondent company, granting it exclusive production and
sales rights to a keyholder on which a patent application was pending. Petitioner was to receive a 5% royalty reducable to 2-1/2% if the patent was not
allowed within five years. The patent application was rejected, and the royalty was accordingly reduced. After paying reduced royalties for fourteen
years, the company sought a judgment declaring the agreement unenforceable. The district court entered summary judgment in the inventor's favor.
The Eighth Circuit reversed. 567 F.2d 757, 196 U.S.P.Q. 281 (8th Cir. 1977).
The Supreme Court granted certiorari "to consider whether federal patent law pre-empts state contract law so as to preclude enforcement of a contract to pay royalties to a patent applicant, on sales of articles embodying
the putative invention, for so long as the contracting party sells them, if a
patent is not granted." 99 S. Ct. at 1097, 201 U.S.P.Q. at 3. Responding negatively, the Court held that federal patent law was not a barrier to the enforceability of the contract in question, and reversed, thereby reinstating
the lower court's judgment for the defendant. Id. at 1101, 201 U.S.P.Q. at 6.
See also Altman, A Quick Point Regarding PerpetualTrade Secret Royalty
Liability, 13 J. MArt. L. REV. 127 (1979).
46. "Limitations upon the diffusion and/or further use of technology already imported" are proscribed by a Group of 77 proposal. Proposed Code
of Conduct, Restrictive Business Practices Chapter, para. B20 (1978).
47. Section C, in its entirety, provides:
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with bureaucratic redtape. Less extensive arrangements will be
especially restricted as smaller organizations have insufficient
financial resources and employee expertise to argue their positions before national authorities.
GUARANTEES/RESPONSIBILITIES/OBLIGATIONS CHAPTER

Common Provision on the Negotiating and ContractualPhases
While it is certainly appropriate to demand that the parties
observe fair and honest business practices in connection with
transfer of technology agreements, 48 it is also provided that they
shall or should be responsive to the "economic and social devel-

opment objectives" of the respective countries. 49 Frankly, the
specific goals of the United States and other countries defy
ready determination. Certainly, minor technology owners have
no information on these possible goals. This exemplifies the
problems developed by the Code drafters' apparent assumption
that all technology transfers are multimillion dollar operations
between parties having the time and talent to determine the economic and social development objectives of the countries affected. The majority of transfers are not of this sort. Hence,
literal compliance with this responsibility is improbable.
Negotiating Phase
One negotiating phase clause suggests that the parties consider requests to include in their agreements a number of provisions 50 and thereafter enunciates examples: the use of locally
[Notwithstanding]*/*** [the provisions]*** [section 4.3]* [of this
chapter transfer of technology transactions or practices and arrangements contained therein shall be deemed] */*** [non-objectionable] ***
[valid]* [if]*/*** [, based upon exceptional circumstanceJ* [the competent national authorities of the] */*** [acquiring partysJ* [technology acquiring]* [country decide that it is in its public interest] */***
[and that on balance the effect on its national economy will not be adverse]* [and it has no substantial adverse effects in other countries] ***.

Id. para. C. This exceptions sub-chapter has not been agreed to by Group
B.
48. Id. Guarantees/Responsibilities/Obligations Chapter, para. Al.
49. Id.
50. The responsiveness to development objectives clause provides:
[Upon request of one of the potential parties to the technology
transfer agreement, the other potential]
[The supplying]*/*** party
[shall] */*** [should] **, to the extent practicable [and appropriate] ,
be responsive to [such of the officially declared] ** [technology acquiring]*/*** countries [of the parties as have been clearly and specifically
indicated by the requesting party; therefore each party, and in particular the potential technology supplier, should consider requests to include in the agreement upon fair and reasonable commercial terms and
conditions] ** [This includes, inter alia,] */***:
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available resources; 5 1 the rendering of technical services; 52 and

unpackaging the various elements included in the particular ofpotential parties
fer.53 The following section demands that both
54
adhere to fair and honest business practices.
Id. para. B2.
51. Use of locally available resources:
(i) specific provisions for the use for the tasks concerned of adequately trained or otherwise suitable local personnel to be designated
and subsequently made available by the potential technology recipient
including managerial personnel, as well as for the training of suitably
skilled local personnel to be designated and subsequently made available by the potential technology recipient;
(ii) specific provisions for the use of locally available materials,
technologies, technical skills, consultancy and engineering services,
and other resources to be indicated and subsequently made available
by the potential technology recipient.
Id. para. B2(a) (i)-B2(a) (ii).
52. Parties should consider requests to include "specific provisions for
the rendering of technical services in the introduction and operation of the
technology to be transferred." Id. para. B2(b).
53. Unpackaging:
Upon request of the potential acquiring party, the potential supplying party [shall] */*** [should]**, to the extent [practicable]** [possible]*/***, [be responsive to inquiries about]** [make known]*/*** the
various elements included in a particular offer, [including the price to
be charged or other consideration to be made for each item involved in
the transaction] */***, [as far as such information (unpackaging) is necessary to evaluate the potential supplying party's offer] **.
Id. para B2(c).
54. The fair and honest business practices statement delineated in the
third paragraph of the Guarantees chapter provides:
When negotiating a technology transfer agreement, the parties
should observe fair and honest business practices and therefore:
(a) Both potential parties
(i)

Fairand reasonableterms and conditions

Should negotiate in good faith with the aim of reaching an
agreement (within a reasonable time and] **/*** upon fair and reasonable [commercial]**/*** terms and conditions, including [agreement

on payments such as]**/*** license fees, royalties, and other consideration; [the price or consideration to be charged shall be non-discriminatory and no less favorable than the consideration usually required by
the supplying party or other technology suppliers for similar technologies under similar circumstances]*
(ii)

Relevant information

Should consider requests to inform each other, to the extent appropriate, about their prior arrangements which may affect the contemplated technology transfer;
(iii)

Confidential information
Should keep secret, in accordance with any obligation, either legal
or contractual, all confidential information received from the other
party and make use of the confidential information received from a potential party only for the purpose of evaluating this party's offer or request or for other purposes agreed upon by the parties;
(iv) Termination of negotiations
May cease negotiations if, during the negotiations, either party determines that a satisfactory agreement can not be reached;
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Section 3(a) (iii) provides that both parties "should keep secret, in accordance with any obligation, either legal or contractual, all confidential information received from the other party
and make use of the confidential information received from a potential party only for the purpose of evaluating this party's offer
or request or for other purposes agreed upon by the parties." 55
Could this mean that absent a statute or a binding contractual
arrangement between the parties, all confidential information
received from the other party must remain secret except for the
purpose of evaluating the other party's offer? If so, this provision is objectionable as, absent statute or agreement, there
should be no duty to keep material confidential. How long must
such information be kept secret? Is it susceptible to valid use if
it becomes available to the public, or is obtained legitimately
from other sources? What happens if the receiving party already possesses it? These questions await response.
However, even if this section contemplates information only
being kept secret pursuant to an appropriate statute or contractual provision, and then only to the extent provided therein, is
the statement really necessary? The parties should abide by
their legal and contractual duties in all aspects of an arrangement, not merely those relating to confidential information. If
no such obligation exists, a negotiating party should not be bur(b)

Potential acquiring party
Should provide the potential technology supplier in a timely manner with the available specific information concerning the technical
conditions and official economic and social development objectives as
well as legislation of the acquiring country relevant to the particular
transfer and use of the technology under negotiation, as far as such information is needed for the supplying party's responsiveness under this
chapter;
(c) Potential supplying party
(i)

Relevant information
[shall]*/*** [should]** disclose, in a timely manner to the

potential technology acquiring party any reason actually known to him,
on account of which the technology to be supplied when used in accordance with the terms and conditions of the proposed agreement, would
not meet particular health, safety, and environmental requirements in
the technology acquiring country already known to him as being relevant in the specific case, as well as any serious health, environmental,
and safety risks known by the supplier associated with the use of the
technology and of the products to be produced by it;
(ii) [shall]*/*** [should]** disclose to the potential technology acquiring party, to the actual extent known to him, any limitation, including any pending official procedure or litigation which adversely
concerns the existence or validity of the rights to be transferred, on his
entitlement to grant the rights or render the assistance and services
specified in the proposed agreement.
Id. para B3.
55. Id. para. B3(a) (iii).
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56
dened by the duty not to disclose.

ContractualPhase
A separate set of guarantees and responsibilities apply to
the contractual phase.57 The proposed versions exemplify the
Group B-Group of 77 split. The Group of 77 language imperatively provides that all agreements shall contain mutually acceptable contractual obligations and shall be subject to the
listed demands. Group B would substitute "should" for "shall"
and thereby transform the guarantees into mere guidelines.
56. See also notes 67-75 and accompanying text infra.
57. The contractual phase guarantees set forth are:
The technology transfer agreement [should] ** (shall] */*** contain
mutually acceptable contractual obligations, including those relating to
payments, and where in accordance with fair and reasonable commer-

cial practice, [should normally provide for] ** [shall be subject to] */***

the following provisions taking into account the specific circumstances
of the individual case:
(i)

Access to improvements

access by the parties for a specified period or for the lifetime of the
agreement to improvements to the technology transferred under the
agreement;
(ii)

Confidentiality

respect for the confidentiality and the use only for the purposes
and on terms stipulated in the agreement of any trade secrets, secret
know-how, and all other confidential information received from the
other party in connection with the transfer of technology;
(iii)

Dispute settlement arrangementsand applicable law

Provisions in this area might be provided elsewhere in the Code
(iv)

Description of the technology

The technology supplier's guarantee that the technology meets the
description contained in the technology transfer agreement;
(v)

Suitabilityfor use

The technology supplier's guarantee that the technology, if
properly used in accordance with the specified instructions contained
in the agreement, is suitable for the use and operation requirements
where such contemplated use and requirements are set forth;
(vi)

Rights to technology transferred

The technology supplier's representation that on the date of the
signing of the agreement, it is, to the best of its knowledge, not aware of
third parties' valid patent rights or similar protection for inventions
which would be infringed by the use of the technology as specified in
the agreement when identically used as it is used by the supplier.
(vii)

Quality standards

The technology recipient's commitment to observe quality
standards agreed upon in cases where the agreement includes the use
of the supplier's trademarks, trade names, or similar identification of
goodwill, and to avoid actions that may injure the supplying party's
goodwill or reputation;
(viii)

Completeness of Information

The supplying party's guarantee that the technical information to
be disclosed will be complete and correct for the purposes directly
specified in the agreement.
Id. para. 4.
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Access to Improvements
The first suggestion on contract terms mandates considering access by the parties for a specified period or the lifetime of
58
the agreement to improvements to the transferred technology.
This would alter the generally existing practice. In the majority
of agreements, there is no access by either party to the other's
improvements. Where one has been sued for patent infringement, and the lawsuit results in a license agreement whereby
the infringer takes a license under the patent holder's patent,
there rarely is any need for provisions dealing with either
party's improvements. Note also that if a small business
licenses a large corporation some technology, it will probably
not desire to grant the enterprise access to its improvements.
Does this section compel access to improvements in such cases?
While the naked language does, these anomalies identify the
weaknesses inherent in an absolute requirement of an access to
improvements provision.
Confidentiality
Confidentiality is a cornerstone of technology transfer, and
there is extensive support for demands to respect confidentiality
for purposes and on terms stipulated in the agreement of any
trade secrets, secret know-how, and other protected information. 59 However, this statement appears to be redundant as it
only provides that a party must abide by a term in the agreement. There should be no obligation where there is no corre60
sponding contractual provision.
Suitability For Use
The fifth responsibility would require that technology suppliers guarantee that the transferred technology is suitable for
the use contemplated by the specified instructions contained in
the agreement. 61 In complex manufacturing, instructions, drawings, and operating manuals may fill thousands of pages. According to this section, they must be included in the document
of the transfer, nonetheless.
There is no actual need for such a guarantee in most agreements. In some cases, a licensee may be more expert than the
licensor and only seek rights under a portion of the technology.
For example, a company may take a license under a paper58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. para. 4(i).
Id. para. 4(ii).
See also id. paras. 4(iii)-4(iv).
Id. para.4(v).
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feeder owned by another organization which would form one
part of the recipient's office copier. There would be no need for
a guarantee that the paper-feeder works in the licensee's copier.
The licensor may not even know whether the feeder works in
that particular use. He may not be that expert in the office copier technology which the licensee employs. It is also probable
that the technology owner would not be willing to supply the
information the licensor would need to make this type of guarantee. 62
Quality Standardsand Completeness of Information

It would be difficult to object to a clause which provides that
the technology recipient has a commitment to observe quality
standards agreed upon in certain instances. 63 This contract
term may not be necessary. This section only applies in cases
"where the agreement includes the use of the supplier's trademarks, trade names, or similar identification of goodwill." 6 4
There may be other cases where quality standards should be imposed. There may be safety or health requirements that could
prompt employment of quality standards. Undoubtedly there
are other valid reasons for incorporating them into transfer
agreements.
In some instances, it may be appropriate for the supplying
party to "guarantee that the technical information to be disclosed will be complete and correct for the purposes directly
specified in the agreement. '65 However, in many agreements,
inclusion of such language may be improper. The aforementioned paper-feeder example is apposite. How would the owner
of the paper-feeder technology know whether the particular
technology would be fit to use with the licensee's copier technology? The simple answer is that he would not and should not
know. This decision should be made by the licensee. This is another example of a proposed clause based on the assumption
that all licensing involves large corporations transferring technical expertise to a licensee in a developing country who has no
knowledge of the particular business area.
This section could probably be improved by language providing that the technology supplier need not supply any more
technical information than he already has in his possession.
Often a company takes a license under undeveloped technology
realizing that it must be completed. How can the licensor in that
62. See also id. para. 4(vi).

63. See id. para. 4(vii).
64. Id.

65. See id. para. 4(viii).
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situation guarantee that the technical information to be disclosed will be complete and correct when all parties realize that
it can not be complete and correct if the licensee is still developing it? Many corporations have agreements of this nature. They
neither expect nor pay for complete technical information, as
66
the technology has not yet been brought to its full potential.
Group of 77 Proposalfor a GuaranteesChapter
The Group of 77 has proposed a chapter on contractualphase guarantees. 6 7 It raises many unanswerable questions.
66. See generally Joelson, United States Law and the Proposed Code of
Conduct on the Transfer of Technology, 23 ANTrTRUST BuuL. 835 (1978).
67. The proposed sub-chapter would state:
4. The technology transfer agreement shall be subject to the following
provisions, taking into account the specific circumstances of the individual case.
(i) Access to improvements
access by the acquiring party to improvements relevant to the technology transferred under the agreement during the lifetime of the agreement;
(ii) Confidentiality
respect for the confidentiality of any trade secrets, secret know-how,
and all other confidential information received from the other party in
connection with the transfer of technology as stipulated in the agreement, provided that this obligation shall not extend beyond an adequate lapse of time after the transmission of each item of secret
information;
(iii) No provision
(iv) Description of the technology

The technology supplier's guarantee that the technology meets the
description contained in the technology transfer agreement;
(v) Suitabilityfor use
The technology supplying party's guarantee that the technology, if used
in accordance with the specifications contained in the agreement, is
suitable for the purpose agreed upon by the parties;
(vi) Rights to the technology transferred

The technology supplying part 's representation that on the date of the
signing of the agreement, itis, tothe best of its knowledge, not aware of

third parties' valid patent rights or similar protection for inventions
which would be infringed by the use of the technology as specified in
the agreement;
(vii) Quality standards

The technology recipient's commitment to observe quality standards
agreed upon in cases where the agreement includes the use of the supplier's trademarks, trade names, or similar identification of goodwill;

(viii) Achievement of predeterminedresults
the supplying party's guarantee that the use of the technology will ensure the achievement of a predetermined result under the conditions
specified in the agreement;

(ix) Completeness of information
the supplying party's guarantee that the content of the technology
transferred is complete and correct for the specific purposes of the
agreement;
(x) Training of personnel
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The confidentiality clause appropriately demands respect for
the confidentiality of information as stipulated in the agreements. 68 However, the limitation that the obligation will not extend beyond an adequate lapse of time after the transmission of
each item of secret information poses potential problems. How
long is this period of time to be? In some cases, it might be six
months, in others, possibly twenty years. More important, one
wonders who is to determine what is an adequate lapse of time.
The Group of 77 would force technology suppliers to guarantee that the technology conforms to the transfer agreement's
description. 69 Another redundancy is caused by inclusion of
to provide adequate training to the personnel of the acquiring party or
to the personnel designated by it, in the knowledge and operation of the
technology transferred, where so required by the acquiring party;
(xi)

Provisions of spare parts,components, etc.

the supplying party shall supply the acquiring party, as required, with
accessories, spare parts, components, and other requirements produced by the supplying party and necessary for using the technology
transferred, at usual prices and for the period specified in the agreement.
5. Considerationfor the technology transferred
(a) Fairand reasonableterms and conditions

shall agree to fair and reasonable terms and conditions when technology is transferred, including licence fees, royalties, and other considera-

tion: the price or consideration to be charged shall be non-

discriminatory and no less favorable than the consideration usually required by the supplying party or other technology suppliers for similar
technologies under similar circumstances;
(b)

Considerationfor the elements of the technology transferred

(i) The price charged or other consideration made for the technology
transferred shall be explicitly determined or, where this is not possible,
all the necessary elements for their determination shall be specified;
(ii) The price charged or other consideration made for all elements
involved in the transfer of technology transactions, including goods and
services insofar as they are part of the transaction, shall be distinctly
specified for each item.
6.

Purchaseof input

Where the acquiring party purchases goods and/or services from
the supplying party, or from any enterprise designated by it, the price
shall be reasonable and fair and not higher than current world prices
for goods or services of the same quality offered on comparable commercial terms and conditions.
7. Sale of output

When the acquiring party sells its output to the supplying party, or
to any enterprise designated by it, the price offered for such products
shall be reasonable and fair and not lower than the current world prices
for the goods of the same quality sold on comparable commercial terms
and conditions.
8.

Effects of nonfulfillment of guarantees

The effects of nonfulfillment of the provisions set forth in this chapter should be governed by the appropriate applicable law.
Group of 77 Proposal For a Sub-Chapter on Guarantees (1978).

68. Id. para C4(ii).
69. Id. para C4(iv).

Transfer of Technology

19791

this clause. If the agreement provides for the description of the
technology, the supplier would not need to guarantee it because
he could already be sued under the agreement if what was
transferred was defective. Similarly, the suitability for use
clause 70 appears to be redundant. Certainly, if the specifications
and purpose are delineated by the parties in the agreement, the
Code need not include a statement that the technology supplier
must agree to do what he has already done.
The quality standards provision would compel transfer
transactions to include the technology recipient's commitment
to observe the ideals concurred in where the contract envisions
the use of a supplier's trademarks, trade names, or similar identification of goodwill.7 1 This is another example of when a party
must agree to live up to that which he has already agreed to.
Does the technology recipient have to agree to be bound by the
quality standards portion of the agreement only where it mentions the utilization of the supplier's identification of goodwill?
Should not the recipient have to commit itself to quality control
for the benefit of the consumer regardless of such identification?
Technology suppliers must represent their unawareness of
any valid patent or similar protective rights which would be infringed by use of the technology transferred.7 2 This clause is basically appropriate. However, it seems to eliminate situations
where suppliers would specifically mention contractually some
third-party patents of which the acquirers were fully aware. The
achievement of a predetermined result section 73 is at best mere
surplusage. Such language would not really be pertinent in
most transfer agreements. Similarly, the proposed spare and
component parts provision 74 is inappropriate. These clauses are
not included in the vast majority of agreements. The consideration for technology transferred section 75 is not really objectionable. A license negotiator would, however, have to provide some
mechanism for determining how much would have to be paid
under the agreement, before even employing the developed
means in arriving at a consideration figure.
GROUP OF

77 PROPOSED CHAPTER ON APPLICABLE LAW AND
SETrLEMENT OF DIsPUTEs

The applicable law and settlement of disputes chapter
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. para.
Id. para.
Id. para.
Id. para.
Id. para.
Id. para.

C4(v).
C4(vii).
C4(vi).
C4(viii).
C4(xi).
C5.
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promulgated by the Group of 7776 has elicited a wide divergence
76. The proposal would add the following chapter:
A. Applicable Law
1. The law applicable to matters relating to public policy (ordre
public) and to sovereignty shall be the law of the acquiring country.
Any clause to the contrary shall be void.
2. Any contractual clause which would be in violation of the public
policy (ordre public) and sovereignty of the acquiring state, particularly in matters concerning its governmental prerogatives or its legislative, regulatory, or administrative powers, shall be null and void.
3. The law applicable to matters of private interest is that which
has a direct, effective, and permanent relationship with the transaction.
4. The choice of the applicable law by the parties, the judge, or the
arbitrators shall be made in conformity with the above rule.
5. The law of the acquiring party shall apply to questions of characterization. In particular, it alone shall be applicable for the determination of matters that may not be submitted to arbitration or which
concern public policy or sovereignty.
6. The principles and rules set forth in this Code shall be applicable. The law chosen by the parties, the judge, or the arbitrator shall be
interpreted and applied in conformity with the Code.
B. Settlement of Disputes
1. The courts and other tribunals of the technology acquiring
country shall have jurisdiction over disputes arising from the conditions or the effects of the contract which concern public policy (ordre
public) or sovereignty. They shall also have jurisdiction over conflicts
of characterization.
2. The contractual relationships between parties to a transfer of
technology agreement may be the subject of a choice of forum or of
arbitration, unless the acquiring country has express rules to the contrary.
The forum chosen must have a direct, effective, and permanent relationship with the contract. Any clause which explicitly or implicitly
excludes the jurisdiction of the courts and other tribunals of the technology acquiring country shall be null and void.
3. In the case of arbitration each party shall designate its arbitrator(s) when the dispute has arisen. The parties and their authorized
arbitrators shall proceed to the designation of a president of the arbitration tribunal. The latter shall be of a nationality which is different from
that of the parties and of their arbitrators.
In the case of lack of agreement on the choice of president, or in the
case of the refusal of one of the parties to designate its arbitrator, such
designation shall be made from a list of arbitrators established within
the framework of this Code and by the organ designated in it. The seat
of arbitration shall be the technology acquiring country.
4. The arbitration process shall take place in conformity with the
UNCITRAL rules for all matters not provided for in this Code.
5. The States parties to this Code agree to enforce, without proceeding to an examination of their merits, the arbitration awards, and
judicial decisions rendered within the framework of this Code, subject
to the public policy (ordre public) of the forum and duly ratified international conventions on the recognition and enforcement of arbitral
awards and judicial decisions.
6. The arbitral award shall, at the request of one of the parties, be
the subject of an examination of its legality and, if necessary, shall be
annulled. Such an examination will be made by a panel of three persons whose decisions shall be taken by a majority vote and who shall be
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of views among the Group of 77 and Group B countries. Group
B generally believes that the choice of law, forum, and arbitration provisions should be subject to individual negotiation by
the parties involved. They have opposed the Group of 77's complex suggestions which are of minimal value to any but the developing-country party.
One proposal requires that the third party of a three-person
arbitration tribunal be of a nationality different from the parties
and the other two arbitrators. 77 As a practical matter, nationalities should have no bearing unless the arbitration is to be a completely political operation. Those looking for an arbitrator to be
a member of the Licensing Executives Society would have to
check the various members' nationalities to determine whether
any could be a suitable third member of an arbitration panel.
INTERNATIONAL MACHINERY

Both the Group of

7778

and Group B international machin-

selected from the list of arbitrators set up within the framework of this
Code.
This examination shall under no circumstances be on the merits of
the dispute.
7. Before proceeding to arbitration, the parties may have recourse
to concilation.
Group of 77 Proposal on Applicable Law and Settlement of Disputes (1978).
77. Id. para. B3.
78. The Group of 77 international machinery informal paper states:
1. Subject to the approval of the Trade and Development Board,
the Commitee on the Transfer of Technology will establish a permanent intergovernmental body (the Governmental Group on the Code of
Conduct on Transfer of Technology (CCC)), consisting of 19 member
countries (9 representing the 77, 6 Group B, 3 Group D, and China).
2. This CCC may create appropriate subsidiary bodies to assist it
in its mandate.
3. The Group's tasks will be:
(i) To exchange views and collect and disseminate information
on matters related to the Code and on national, regional, and international actions in the implementation and application of the Code;
(ii) To undertake studies for the purpose of furthering the aims
of the Code;
(iii) To consider relevant reports from governments and studies
from other United Nations bodies;
(iv) To submit annual reports on its work to the Trade and Development Board of UNCTAD;
(v) To make appropriate recommendations
on the
implementation and application of the Code.
4. In carrying out the above tasks, neither the Committee nor its
subsidiary organs may act like a tribunal.
5. The Group will review the implementation of the Code with a
view to its reappraisal every four years for the purpose of making proposals for its improvement and further development, taking into ac-
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ery proposals 79 contemplate the establishment of a permanent
body, to be part of UNCTAD, which would review the Code. The
United States should not support such an arrangement. Any
benefits to be obtained are certain to be outweighed by prohibitive operating costs. Existence of such a committee will merely
increase the amount of time and effort expended in continual
negotiations and revisions and supplementary political
speeches. If a Code is instituted, there should be no permanent
body administering it. Even if there must be such a permanent
count relevant activity in the field of transfer of technology within the
framework of the United Nations' agencies, organs, and other bodies.
6. In performance of its functions, the Group shall meet twice a
year.
7. The Secretariat of the Group shall be the UNCTAD Secretariat.
At the request of the Committee on Transfer of Technology, this Secretariat shall submit, and other UN bodies, particularly WIPO and
UNIDO, shall be invited to submit relevant studies, documentation, and
other information to the Group for its consideration.
8. The UNCTAD Secretariat shall be adequately equipped so as to
assist states, members of UNCTAD, particularly in the formulation of
national laws, regulations, and policies to implement the provisions of
the Code at the national level, and in the establishment of appropriate
institutional machinery towards this aim.
79. The Group B proposed chapter provides:
1. Subject to the approval of the Trade and Development Board,
the Committee on the Transfer of Technology will provide institutional
machinery.
2. This Committee may create appropriate subsidiary bodies to
assist it in its work.
3. Tasks
(a) Overview Procedure
(i) To exchange views on matters related to the Code and on
experience gained in its operation;
(ii) To undertake studies for the purpose of furthering the aims
of the Code;
(iii) To consider relevant reports and studies from other UN bodies;
(iv) To submit reports on its work to the TDB of the UNCTAD.
In carrying out the above tasks, neither the Committee nor its subsidiary organs may act like a tribunal or reach conclusions on the conduct of individual governments or parties to a transfer of technology
transaction.
(b) Review Procedure
To review the implementation of the Code with a view to its reappraisal not less than six years after its adoption and to make, if appropriate, proposals for its improvement and further development, taking
into account relevant activity in the field of transfer of technology
within the framework of the United Nations' agencies, organs, and other
bodies.
4. Secretariat
The Secretariat shall be the UNCTAD Secretariat. At the request
of the Committee on Transfer of Technology, this Secretariat shall submit, and other UN bodies, particularly WIPO and UNIDO, shall be invited to submit relevant studies, documentation, and other information
to the Committee.
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body, it should certainly not be an arm of UNCTAD, as it is
hardly capable of providing unbiased input or a competent administrative organization.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
What will be the final result of these negotiations? I expect
that ultimately a Code will be agreed upon. However, some of
the proposals under current consideration may be omitted or
phrased in such vague language that they will be meaningless.
Initially I believe the Code will be voluntary. At present, the
Group B countries will not accept a mandatory Code. I also suspect that there will be a permanent UNCTAD body to review
and alter the Code. It will probably continue to assert the Group
of 77's position on various Code modifications and will attempt
to make the "working paper" Code mandatory. The Code will
exclude subsidiaries from its scope initially, but they will be included eventually, particularly if UNCTAD continues to advocate this position and the United States opposition receives
dwindling support from other Group B nations.
While it appears unlikely that the Group B countries would
agree to a legally binding code, some individual components will
undoubtedly be enacted as federal legislation. Some aspects of
the Code may be used in American litigation on transfer of technology agreements. Even if it is not statutorily adopted in the
United States, certain courts may consider the Code a meritorious guideline to be abided by in transfer transactions. The
United States Department of Justice may be at the forefront of
efforts urging legislative and judicial adoption of the restrictive
business practice standards. In any event, it would behoove
those preparing future licensing agreements to avoid conflicts
with the Code. Even though a finalized version of the Code may
not have initial legal standing in the country involved, one can
not definitively predict what will happen during the term of the
license agreement.

THE JOHN MARSHALL LAW REVIEW
Number 1

Fall, 1979

Volume 13

Member, National Conference of Law Reviews
CECUTIVE EDITO
ROBERT N. FELTOOD
Editor-in-Chief
SHAUN MCPARLAND

Comments
ROBIN KAIGH

Casenotes

ARGARET J. MULLE

LESTER M. JOSEPH
Managing
STEPHEN M. MARTIN
Lead Articles

Research

5SOCIATE EDITO]
TIMOTHY J. OXLEY

ANN L. WALLACE

Managing
A. SCHLANGER
Lead Articles

Comments

DAVID

JONATHAN D. SAVAGE

Casenotes
JEFFREY A. RYVA

Research
STAFF
TOM AIELLO
RONALD L. BELL
ANDREW BENSI
JEANNE BISCHOFF
WILLIAM BLACK
PAUL BRADLEY
MARY BROWN

ROBERT L. CARTER
CAROLE CERVANTES

RANDALL F. CLARK
THOMAS A. COENS
EDWARD COHEN
BARRY G. COLLINS
JAMES CUMBERWORTH
JAMES DEANO
ELLEN DOMPH
BRUCE C. DOPKE
CELESTE EBERS
GAIL EISENBERG
DAVID A. FANTAUZZI
ROSANNE J. FARACI
DOUGLAS G. FELDER
CONSTANCE FISHER
ROGER P. FLAHAVEN
JON R. FLYm

JAMES FRAzIN
ELLEN FRIBERG
WANDA W. GIRALDI
PAULA GIRoux
WARREN GRAYSON
DON HEALY
JOYCE E. HEINZERLING

KErrH H. OLIN
VIRGINIA O'RYAN
BARBARA PENCE
DOUGLAS PINTAURO
CATHY PILKINGTON
DAVID PLATEK

SCOTT J. HORNE

MARGARITA PRIMOZICH
TARAs R. PROCZKO
ALFRED RICCIARDI

DENNIS HUDSON
CHRISTOPHER W.
KANTHAK
EUGENE F. KEEFE
ELENA Z. KEZELIS
JACQUELYN KIDDER
ANDREW KoPON
LESLIE LAMPING
DEAN LEFFELMAN
DAVID M. LEVY
TERESA LISTON

LYNN PRICE

CURTIS SAHAXIAN

JUDITH L. MACIOR

MARC SARGIS
GERALDINE C. SIMMONS
JEFFREY SMITH
JAMES L. SONAGERI
KATHRYN A. SPALDING
WILLIAM SPANGENBERG
KATHRYN SPERLAK
DAVID M. SWEET
DONALD G. WEILAND
SHARON WELLS
JODI WITTENBERG
JUDITH WOLLITZ
ELLIOT R. ZINGER

DAVID MATLIN
SUSAN MAYNARD
GARY MosTow
JOHN S. NOBLE

FACULTY ADVISORS
RICHARD M. CALKINS
GERALD E. BERENDT
JANE C. CLARK

ANTHONY S. Zrro
ROBERT C. PERRY

